New Zealand Company of Master Mariners

Harbourmasters in some of the country’s busiest stretches of water are calling for more power to investigate incidents where boats narrowly avoid colliding. They say it is only a matter of time before someone else is killed in a collision, and want to be able to try to stop any future accidents. ‘Sometimes it’s a daily basis, sometimes it’s multiple times a day,” says Marlborough Sounds harbourmaster Alex van Wijngaarden, who fears that too few of these close calls are actually being investigated. Port of Whangarei harbourmaster Ian Niblock agrees, saying that the near misses are of concern because they are an indication that there could potentially be fatal accidents. Officially called close quarter incidents, all near misses on the water are reported to Maritime New Zealand. However, they say they cannot look into every incident, and that investigations are decided on a case-by-case basis. Harbourmasters themselves can only ask for a person’s name and address after a close quarter incident, but they cannot investigate beyond that. They are calling for the power to conduct investigations in their own stretches of water.  However, Associate Minister of Transport Nathan Guy is unaware of any issues raised by harbourmasters. “We think the current legislation is working pretty well.” says Guy. 

Some would say that at some ports the Harbourmaster would be the last person to investigate a near miss.  Some Harbourmasters have no experience nor qualifications and at one major NZ port the position of Harbourmaster is (or was) filled on a roster basis from senior executive staff.

The above notice is prominently displayed on the Greater Wellington Regional Council web site and has previously been published in Wellington newspapers. The wording in the above is not the same as in WRC by-law 6.3.1 nor the relevant collision prevention rules  and gives a completely false interpretation of the present international collision rules. The by-law and the rules use the term “must not impede” and not “must give way”. There appears to be a culture which has developed in New Zealand where large ships think that they are the stand on vessels and all small vessels must keep out of their way at all times with no rights what so ever.

This culture probably comes from Maritime New Zealand and its advisors and is demonstrated in the findings of investigations into collisions.

Two collisions come to mind. Both occurred at night with little wind and both vessels in each case could see each other well before the collision. The larger ship in each case only saw sidelights of the other vessel so should have assumed that each smaller vessel was a sailing vessel with limited manoeuvrerability because of the lack of wind. In both cases the larger ships carried on at full speed until just before the collision.

In one case the  non compliance with the “narrow channel”  (Rule 9) was stated as the main contributing cause and in the other case the non compliance with a harbour by-law based on the unique New Zealand 500 ton rule.  The operative words in both rules  are “not to impede” which are accepted internationally as not the same as “keep out of the way”.  In fact both  rules state a vessel that is not to be impeded remains fully obliged to comply with the Steering and Sailing Rules when the two vessels are approaching one another so as to involve a risk of collision and in these two cases the overriding rule would be that a power driven vessel must keep out of the way of a sailing vessel.

This is certainly not the message that the above poster gives –  MIGHT IS RIGHT –  It is a sad day that we have reached this state of affairs in New Zealand

From the booklet “Across the Water”,  biography of Captain A.E. Wilmott, ferry master and later Marine Superintendent/Harbour Master at Heysham for LMS Railway steamers.

“Although modern in every other respect, none of the Fleetwood steamers was fitted with wireless telegraphy until 1921 and instead they carried on the bridge two carrier pigeons for use in an emergency, the basket containing them placed on board immediately before the ship left Fleetwood.”

Time to update GMDSS — but with what?

Lloyds List 9 March 2010 by Peter Blackhurst

WHILE there may be differing opinions on when the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System actually began — its conception in 1979, the GMDSS Conference in 1988 or the full implementation in February 1999 — it is widely accepted that little has changed to the system in the intervening years and that now is the time to look at bringing the GMDSS up to date.

To that end, the request for a review of the GMDSS was placed before the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee at its 86th session. It agreed that Comsar, the sub-committee on radiocommunications and search and rescue, should carry out a scoping exercise over its next two sessions to assess which areas need to be reviewed, amended, and included or excluded.

Several forums have already started fringe discussions to open up the general awareness of the issues. These started at the joint IMO/International Telecommunication Union experts group last summer, where some excellent brainstorming took place. Earlier this month, a joint meeting of various organisations on HQS Wellington in London, organised by the Royal Institute of Navigation, hosted a discussion on electronic GMDSS that covered some pertinent questions: Has GMDSS worked? Can it do better? Which new technologies can be used? What will be its role for future electronic Navigation?

Another area of focus, including the question of its continued relevance, is Chapter IV of Solas, which deals with making a distress alert and call. One idea currently circulating is changing the title of Chapter IV to distress communications; all distress-related communications would be transferred into the chapter, while other communication needs are addressed by other chapters. There is a strong view that distress communications should be clearly separated from other types of communications.

Also for consideration is the demise of Telex and the bleak future of High Frequency; although carriage requirements include the relatively obsolete system, there are concerns over a lack of HF stations. Denmark closed its HF services in October 2009, for instance.

The four areas of carriage requirements (sea areas A1 to A4) might be reduced; this might come about if the MF/HF solution is amended, especially as there is a great deal of discussion regarding vessels in areas outside the coverage of Inmarsat’s geostationary satellites. The work being carried out by the IMO’s Ship Design and Equipment sub-committee may well reach the conclusion, in conjunction with Comsar, that vessels sailing in polar regions should be mandated to make special arrangements with administrations and coastal states for the transmission and reception of distress and safety messaging. These communications systems may well include HF or utilisation of other new technologies as appropriate.

It has been further suggested that the Automatic Identification System can become part of the GMDSS. There are many benefits in the way that AIS information is promulgated between ships, and this has really helped navigational safety, the monitoring of vessels by shore stations and in global information services.

Additionally, satellite detection of AIS signals is providing an additional resource that could be used for landing safety information. It could be that this system can provide a medium for relaying distress and safety information, or certainly in assisting with Search and Rescue activities.

It has also been suggested that Long Range Information and Tracking and Ship Security Alerting System may also have a place within the GMDSS.

Within discussion groups there is a strong feeling that the GMDSS should be maintained as a simple, reliable and responsive system, and not clogged up with unnecessary traffic generated by the misuse of ‘Digital Selective Calling’ facilities, multiple acknowledgments and relays (primarily by HF but also with other systems).

With that, we come full circle. An idea gaining ground is one that was first considered at the conception of the GMDSS: that it should consist of a VHF/satellite solution for distress and safety alerting, and that the need for MF or HF is superfluous to modern needs except in some commercial applications.

Electronic navigation will require much spectrum in its implementation and the release of current MF and HF frequencies may well be acceptable to the user needs. Digitisation of VHF and the use of other systems such as WiMax may also provide the connectivity for this large exchange of data.

We find ourselves at the beginning of the path in the evolutionary process. We have to be mindful of existing equipment that is installed and ensure that compatibility into the future is assured; that any changes in the system will provide cost savings to the operator and will not force the undue installation of new equipment before its time.

Finally, when this process is complete, we need a continuing review to ensure that the GMDSS remains modern and efficient.

Peter Blackhurst is head of maritime safety services at Inmarsat.

From Lloyds List Thursday 4 February 2010 by Sam Ignarski

AMONG the rules of thumb you are taught in the early months of marine insurance training used to be that the pilots of ships had, under the laws of pilotage, essentially no liability for negligence.

The ship and the master had to answer for faults or negligence in the event of loss or damage, for his role was nothing more than that of an advisor to the bridge, even if the services were compulsory.

Pilots, ex-seafarers themselves, often of great vintage, were not necessarily held in the greatest of esteem.

Take this reference to the pilot in Conrad’s impressive short story Youth: “We worked out of the Thames under canvas, with a North Sea pilot on board. His name was Jermyn, and he dodged all day long about the galley drying his handkerchief before the stove. Apparently he never slept. He was a dismal man, with a perpetual tear sparkling at the end of his nose, who either had been in trouble or was in trouble, or expected to be in trouble — could not be happy unless something went wrong.

“He mistrusted my youth, my common-sense and my seamanship, and made a point of showing it in 100 little ways. I dare say he was right. It seems to me I knew very little then and I know not much more now, but I cherish a hate for that Jermyn to this day.”

And so the tyro marine insurance man would witness the steady trickle of groundings and casualties of ships under pilotage, where the blunders and their consequences were paid for by claims submitted by the ship to the underwriters.

Pilots and their associations therefore have tended over the years not to carry errors and omissions insurance, and few, if any, have had cause to rue the day that their frugality has caused. Trouble has come instead from the modern tendency to apply criminal sanctions against pilots.

The latest manifestation of this tendency comes from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Readers may recall how on March 22, 2008, the offshore supply ship Neftegaz-67 collided with the panamax bulk carrier Yang Hai near Hong Kong, resulting in the death of 18 Ukrainian crew members on the supply ship following its capsizing.

This was the worst maritime accident locally since the capsize of the Macau ferry Fat Shan , which capsized during Typhoon Rose in August 1971.

The two masters and two pilots involved have all been jailed following a 90-day trial in a Hong Kong district court before Judge Susan D’Almada Remedios.

Yuriy Kulemesin, the Ukrainian master of the supply ship, received a sentence of three years and two months for breaking collision regulation rules five, eight and nine — failure to keep a proper lookout, failure to avoid a collision and failure to navigate properly in a narrow channel.

Tang Dock-wah, the senior pilot on board the bulk carrier was sentenced to three years imprisonment. Yao Hai master Lin Bo and the ship’s junior pilot, Bruce Chun, were both sent down for 30 months, all three for breaking collision regulations five and eight.

By all accounts this was a horrible casualty, duly marked by the judge who imposed a deterrent sentence for serious errors of navigation to mark the loss of 18 lives. It is not surprising that the court gallery was packed with the families of the pilots, for the previous imperviousness of pilots to paying the legal consequences of professional negligence has gone the way of the seafarers in Hong Kong also.

Word in the small world of marine should go out that, as in San Francisco, so also in Hong Kong and, we can imagine, any mature maritime jurisdiction centre in today’s environment, the untouchable status of pilots is no more.

What should today’s pilots — and indeed seafarers in general — do to cover themselves against the day when they are involved in a serious lapse of judgement or skill. Professional negligence insurance does not often encompass the paying of legal fees for defendants in criminal courts.

P&I insurance has visibly struggled with the legal costs and expenses that arise whenever a master or deck officer is in the dock under a criminal indictment. Yet it must be said that the hazard of criminalisation is a very real part of the spectrum of risks facing pilots and seafarers.

For these individuals, the trauma of an operational failure, which in the modern world is often painfully visible and career-threatening in any event, is followed by arrest and submission to the mercies of the criminal law system of the country concerned.

Some have a very rough time of it indeed, stranded far from home, broke and stuck in jail, with or without the help of consular assistance or the full attention of the owners and clubs concerned.

Errors of judgement or even blunders pepper the lives of many if not all of us. By definition, these acts or omissions lack mens rea, that is to say a guilty mind which formed an intention to do the thing complained of. The traditional plea of anyone in the aftermath of such errors or blunders is invariably: “I did not mean to”. It is usually in retrospect that the charge of careless or reckless conduct is made, which is a kind of trade description of the error in the first place.

Is it really beyond the ken of marine insurance to lay on within the spectrum of covers some kind of contingency for fees for the criminalised seafarer? Legal costs insurers do it all the time, which was of some help to the pilot on board the Cosco Busan , though it did not help the unfortunate man’s progress to jail.

Of one thing we can be sure. The modern need for an individual culprit in many societies is not going to go away very soon and the criminal law can be a rather wayward and blunt instrument in itself.

So certain is the progress of the criminalisation of seafarers in our times that a perfectly good case can be made for it as a marine peril.

Many former pupils  will mourn the loss of the former Director of both the Wellington and Auckland Navigation Schools. 

Captain Mac joined Shaw Savill in 1936 where he remined until 1952, the latter years spent on the MANZ vessel “Ottawa Valley”.

He obtained his Extra Master’s Certificate and joined the NZ Marine Department as examiner of Masters and Mates in 1954. 

Later he was appointed Director of the Wellington School where he remained until transferring to the Auckland School in 1970.  

He retired about 1980 and then obtained his Amatuer Radio Operators Certificate and was in regular contact using morse with many “ham” operators around the world.

Fact and Fiction – Salvage contract misunderstood but still remains essential, writes Todd Busch President of the International Salvage Union

Lloyds List -Thursday 10 December 2009

LLOYD’S Open Form remains the most commonly used form of salvage contract. It has served the shipping community for over 100 years and has been regularly revised to ensure it meets the needs of its users.

But as I go about my business — meeting shipowners, members of the insurance community and lawyers — it is not uncommon to hear concerns about LOF and sometimes revealing misconceptions about one or more of its features. There seems to be a division between regular users of LOF, who clearly understand it well, and the rest.

The International Salvage Union is quite prepared to accept its share of responsibility that such misunderstandings have taken root — but I am committed to making the effort to explain LOF’s features and benefits.

Of course I have an interest to declare, as one of the key objectives of the International Salvage Union is to ensure that Lloyd’s Open Form remains relevant and popular.

That is because, from the salvors’ point of view, it can facilitate swift intervention in a developing casualty situation. And the long experience of our members shows that delaying the involvement of professional salvors, particularly at the onset, can seriously limit the intervention options and can sometimes make what should have been a relatively simple solution more complex, more risky and often more costly.

Commentators sometimes say that modern communications have eroded the need for the Lloyd’s Open Form. They argue that the ease with which the master can take advice from shore-based colleagues means that other forms of contract or commercial negotiation should be used.

There is a grave risk in the master being subservient to shore-based authorities. Only the master at the scene can properly judge the condition of his vessel, the weather, sea state and all other factors, in order to make the decision as to whether salvage assistance urgently needs to be engaged.

LOF is a simple contract form with no up-front “haggling” which again facilitates that quick intervention if the circumstances mean that is the right thing to do.

Another misunderstanding is that the master of the casualty gives up command of the vessel when LOF is agreed. That is not true. The salvage master assumes responsibility for the salvage operation but the master remains in command of his vessel – unless it is completely abandoned and then boarded by the salvors. It is also sometimes thought that in that situation the salvor can claim ownership of the casualty vessel – again that is not true. Even when a vessel has been abandoned, the ownership remains with the shipowners and the cargo interests.

Lloyd’s Open Form is not an open cheque for the salvor. True, fees are not agreed “upfront” but most LOF cases are settled agreeably between the salvor and the shipowner, cargo interests and their insurers once the job is done. If agreement cannot be reached by negotiation, then the case is referred to arbitration through the Lloyd’s Salvage Arbitration Branch. If either party does not agree with the arbitrator’s decision, there is an appeal procedure.

Recourse to litigation under English law at the High Court is rare, and can only arise on a point of law. It means that disputes are not unnecessarily costly and analysis of the salvage awards made show a remarkable consistency over the past decade.

This article can only hint at the importance of LOF and some of the myths surrounding it, but it is certainly in the long term interests of the wider marine community that there should be a readily available, worldwide professional salvage capability.

LOF helps to ensure that provision by offering quality, integrity, experience, transparency and fairness to all parties involved in a casualty — and that encourages salvors to make the necessary investment. And I encourage readers to explore the benefits of this unique and durable salvage contract. Todd Busch is president of the International Salvage Union

Monday 2 November 2009 Lloyds List 

Crew competence still a cause for concern

“It is all very well to criticise regulations and the regulators, but so often the real blame for crew incompetence must surely lie with whoever employed the crew”

YEARS ago, and long before the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code had banished the casual caller from port premises, two of us were sitting on a pile of railway sleepers in an East Anglian port watching a small chemical tanker arrive. It was a smart, apparently well-kept little ship, with a pilot aboard. It approached the quay with every sign that the berthing would be undertaken speedily and without incident. Then began what can only be described as a comedy routine, as at both ends of the vessel, the crew gave a truly memorable performance of mind-blowing incompetence.

The pilot had made his approach perfectly, but the seafarers forward and aft seemed quite incapable of getting lines ashore. Forward, they seemed unable to fasten on a heaving line, despite helpful advice from the linesman on the quay and a torrent of invective from the master on the bridge. The officers in charge of this command performance seemed to be totally incapable of issuing any orders and stood with expressions of despair on their faces, occasionally waving their arms. Heaving lines fell into the water, the ship fell off the quay, the crew milled about on the forecastle and poop, tripping over ropes and over their own big feet. They seemed terrified of putting any weight on the lines and the ship moved up and down the quay as first one end, then the other appeared dominant. Eventually, we saw the pilot on the foredeck helping to turn up the backspring. It was clearly the only way he was going to get home. There was another bout of drama as the gangway was dropped on the quay with a crash. It was clear that whoever had signed on the crew of this chemical carrier had not bothered to ascertain that the seafarers were able. “Perhaps they were chemists,” said my companion as the performance ended.

Pilots, as the chap who had brought in this vessel would clearly have agreed, are good judges of crew competence. From the moment they climb the ladder, after first giving it a huge tug to make sure somebody has bothered to lash it on, until the moment they step ashore in the case of an inbound ship, they watch the crew in one of its busiest phases. While they will get to know regular callers, they have to take the competence of strangers on trust.

Port state control inspectors are called upon to ascertain the competence of the crew, which they do by perhaps asking them some sample questions, and if they really want to test them, asking them to lower a boat into the water, or start the emergency fire pump. But if they really wanted to ascertain the safety of that ship, (because this is all about safety and not mere bureaucracy) they would board with the pilot and observe the performance as the crew is effectively put to the test.

There is a worrying article in the latest issue of the Nautical Institute Seaways magazine from a senior pilot in the New South Wales port of Newcastle, a port which has seen more than its fair share of events, from great armadas of bulkers anchored offshore to the spectacular grounding of the Pasha Bulker, which dragged an anchor in a gale and blew ashore. Malcolm Goodfellow works in an exceptionally busy port in which a high proportion of the traffic is large dry bulk carriers entering light and departing fully laden. Margins for error are very small, and potential for a fairly frightful disaster substantial. Not that Newcastle is anything unique in this respect. In his article, Capt Goodfellow complains that in many cases, crew competence is often inadequate for the job in hand, and while the presence of the pilot is supposed to supplement the bridge team, “in many instances, the pilot’s presence on the bridge reduces the effective bridge team to one: the pilot himself”.

This is not just opinion from a pilot who might have an axe to grind. His arguments are backed up by two separate surveys by Newcastle Port Corp pilots, one relating to crew competence and the other relating to anchoring practice and general precautions in the roadstead off the port.

Some of the findings from the first report were alarming in the extreme. These ranged from the 15% of bridge teams which were unable to operate their own equipment properly, 68% not monitoring the helm during pilotage, 15% having difficulty mooring the vessel (those chemists may have emigrated?) and 11% have English language difficulties. While only 8% of helmsmen have trouble steering, just one hamfisted and confused person at the wheel can make the most almighty mess with a 50 m beam ship in a channel that is 180 m wide. Put into perspective, 8% of the helmsmen being off-colour means that more than 260 of these chaps per annum could cause difficulties to the pilots. The same percentage could not handle tugs correctly. In 85% of cases, there was no attempt to tell the pilot about the ship’s characteristics, which seems rather remiss. There was, worryingly, a lot more along these lines.

There is absolutely no suggestion that Newcastle is unique in attracting large numbers of ships crewed by incompetents, and the experience will undoubtedly mirror the concern felt in ports all over the world. Indeed, the scrutiny of ships entering this important Australian export terminal might be considered quite close, with the main exporters now focusing increasingly on ship quality in the chartered tonnage that is taken on. There are also certain local sensitivities that go back to the ‘Ships of Shame’ inquiry, when there was some evidence that dry bulkers (at a time when many of the operators were barely breaking even) were not the best-run vessels arriving on the Australian coast.

But that was then and this is now. Capt Goodfellow suggests that the findings in Newcastle ought to encourage the same sort of inquiry in other ports throughout the world, to provide a more universal assessment of competence.

THE Newcastle pilots are not unusual in what they expect when they board a ship, where they hope for a competent bridge team, a helmsman who can actually steer with some precision and understand their helm orders. They want the deck crew to be able to take the tug lines promptly and safely, as the ship enters a narrow channel at some considerable speed. They want the ship to be made fast as it reaches the berth. None of it, as they say, is rocket science, or an unreasonable expectation. It seems sad that they are disappointed so often.

Almost on cue, the same week that Seaways appeared, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau was publishing a report on an incident in Port Hedland waters, where a departing fully laden capesize went aground after suffering a steering gear failure within minutes of letting go all its tugs. Iron King was suffering one of these maddening intermittent steering gear faults, and the investigators were critical of the inability of the ship team to put in hand their emergency procedures fast enough. It was clearly one of those incidents that pilots and shipmasters have nightmares about. It was not so much a competency issue, however.

But the message is coming in about the quality of ship’s crews from around the world. The ‘simple’ matter of an ability to steer a ship has been causing concern to pilots from the Suez Canal to Yokohama, and competency complaints are a regular feature in P&I Club publications and accident investigators’ reports.

Capt Goodfellow suggests that contributing factors include varying training standards under STCW 78/95, inefficient implementation by flag states, vessel crewing levels, operational pressures on masters and crews and modern vessel complexities. He adds “and the rest”. It is true that a ship lying securely alongside is the wrong venue for an adequate port state inspection, when, if the paperwork is adequate and the appearance of the ship passable, the inspectors may not dig any deeper.

As I so often complain, it is all very well to criticise regulations and the regulators, but so often the real blame for crew incompetence must surely lie with whoever employed the crew. Everyone blames everyone else about such matters, but surely an owner who signs on incompetents is as culpable as anyone else. The owner might hold up his hands and blame the crew manager, or point out that all the crew paperwork was perfect, but it is still his responsibility to ensure that people who take his ship to sea are capable of doing the job, and have been properly trained.

If the helmsman who speaks no known language answers a five degrees port helm order by hurling the wheel hard over to starboard, with the ship running into Newcastle at 10 knots and the tugs not yet connected, with the master’s mind in neutral and the OOW making himself a cup of tea, the owner ought to bear some of the responsibility for the carnage. Is that so very unreasonable?